FAKTOR-FAKTOR BAGI IKAT JAMIN MAHKAMAH

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Sumber gambar di SINI

Di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Marzuki Mohd Kamal [2016] 1 LNS 1332, YA Hakim Che Mohd Ruzima Ghazali telah merujuk kepada satu kes yang diputuskan oleh Hakim Augustine Paul di dalam kes Pendakwaraya lawan Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim [1998] 4 CLJ 387; [1998] 4 MLJ 481 yang menyenaraikan faktor-faktor yang perlu diambil kira oleh Mahkamah sebelum membenarkan atau menolak permohonan ikat jamin dalam sesuatu kes jenayah.

Saya kemukakan di bawah ini kenyataan YA Hakim tersebut sebagai panduan:

"Kesalahan di bawah s. 395/397 KK diklasifikasikan sebagai kesalahan tidak boleh dijamin di bawah Jadual Pertama, Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (KTJ). Namun begitu, s. 388 KTJ memberikan mahkamah kuasa budi bicara untuk melepaskan orang kena tuduh dengan membenarkan ikat jamin kecuali bagi kes yang melibatkan hukuman mati atau pun penjara seumur hidup. Sementara itu, undang-undang berkait dengan ikat jamin telah dinyatakan secara jelas oleh Augustine Paul H (beliau pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim [1998] 4 CLJ 387; [1998] 4 MLJ 481. Di muka surat 490 keputusan kes tersebut beliau telah membuat pemerhatian berikut:

Before embarking on a consideration of the merits of the application, it is first necessary to advert to the law relating to bail. This area of the law is governed by ss. 387, 388 and 389 of the CPC. Section 387 of the CPC deals with bailable offences. Where a person is charged with a bailable offence, he is entitled to be released on bail as of right (see PP v. Dato' Mat [1991] 2 MLJ 186; Sebastian v. PP [1968] 1 LNS 132; [1968] 2 MLJ 214; R v. Lim Kwang Seng & Ors [1955] 1 LNS 133; [1956] MLJ 178; Bakshi Sardari Lal v. Supt, Tehar Central Jail [1968] Cr LJ 675; Ratilall Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector of Customs AIR 1967 SC 1939). Section 388 of the CPC deals with non-bailable offences. In the case of such offences, bail is at the discretion of the court (see Lim Kiap Khee v. PP [1987] CLJ Rep 717; [1987] 2 CLJ 442; [1988] 1 MLJ 198). Section 389 of the CPC (see 490) empowers the High Court to, inter alia, direct that any person be admitted to bail. This power is also exercisable at the discretion of the court (see PP v. Zulkifflee bin Hassan [1990] 1 CLJ Rep 249; [1990] 2 CLJ 8; [1990] 2 MLJ 215). The discretion to grant or not to grant bail must, however, be exercised judicially (see Re KS Menon [1946] 1 LNS 26; [1946] MLJ 49). As Das J observed in Sagri Bhagat & Ors v. State of Bihar AIR 1951 at 497, the difficulty in laying down a formula of universal application in exercising this discretion is that the consideration will vary from case to case and it cannot be confined within the framework of a cut and dry formula. In PP v. Wee Swee Siang [1948] 1 LNS 49; [1948] MLJ 114, Callow J set out the following factors which the court may take into consideration when granting or refusing bail:

(1) whether there was or was not reasonable ground for believing the accused guilty of the offence
(2) the nature and gravity of the offence charged
(3) the severity and degree of punishment that might follow
(4) the danger of the accused absconding if released on bail
(5) his character, means and standing
(6) the danger of the offence being continued or repeated
(7) the danger of the witnesses being tampered with
(8) opportunity to the accused to prepare the defence; and
(9) the long period of detention of the accused and probability of further period of delay

The list is not exhaustive (see Che Su bte Daud v. PP [1978] 1 LNS 23; [1978] 2 MLJ 162). Thus in Yusof bin Mohamed v. PP [1995] 1 LNS 291; [1995] 3 MLJ 66, Abdul Malik Ishak J added the larger interest of the public and the country as a whole to the list of factors to be considered in making a decision on an application for bail (see also State v. Jaspal Singh Gill AIR 1984 SC 1503). It is the net result of all the considerations for and against the accused which must ultimately decide the matter (see Che Su bte Daud v. PP [1978] 1 LNS 23; [1978] 2 MLJ 162). It must be observed that the jurisdiction must be exercised properly because it will affect the doctrine of presumption of innocence of the accused which underlies a criminal trial. However, as Bail: Law and Practice by MR Mallick (2^nd Ed) says at 193:

But the fact that the accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is proved against him beyond all reasonable doubt is not a relevant consideration for grant of bail. Pre-trial detention in itself is not an evil, nor opposed to the basic (see 491) presumption of innocence.

In support, the learned author referred to State v. P Sugathan [1988] Cr LJ 1036 where CS Nair J said:

In some quarters, a feeling seems to exist that the object of criminal law is to protect the rights of the accused and that the criminal justice system is envisioned as a sentinel of the rights of the accused. It is not so. The law is the sentinel of rights, of the society and of the individual. The rights of the criminal defendant will be as zealously guarded, as the cause of public justice. Pre-trial detention in itself is not an evil, nor opposed to the basic presumption of innocence. Pronouncements of the Supreme Court have recognised the importance of effective investigation, as much as the rights of the accused."

Kes di atas bolehlah diguna pakai oleh mana-mana orang kena tuduh dalam memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk dibenarkan ikat jamin.

Harap membantu.